CASE STUDY

The shape of the international order: the case study of AUKUS

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Abstract
This article argues that in the 21st century, international order has not only become unstable but also short-term in nature and issue-based, which has led to the emergence of a number of alliances whose functionality can be questioned. A number of alliances are being formed and are in existence but without any clear goals and objectives. This hypothesis is applied to understand the nature of the recently formed AUKUS—Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States' alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. The paper, taking the framework of international order, argues that AUKUS would be one such alliance that has started with a lot of promises but its fundamental proposition to counter the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region—although it does not mention the name of the country—is impractical. Given the economic rise of China as well as the example of the Five Eyes (FVEY) of intelligence sharing mechanism of the Anglophone countries formed during the early years of the Cold War, the AUKUS may survive the test of time but it also may exist as an example of the patterns of the current international order—that is another alliance without a clear path. This article also takes into account of the reaction of the Southeast Asian nations and criticisms against AUKUS in Australia. It points out how Australia's security should be viewed more comprehensively.

Keywords
AUKUS, Indo-Pacific, Quad, International Order, China's Rise
Introduction

The nature and characteristics of international order have shifted in the 21st century. While there were clearly discernible locations of power in the 20th century, 21st century power politics is equally indefinable and volatile. Relationships among states, their patterns of engagements, and rules of the game are shifting rapidly. Such changes at the structural level rather went mostly unnoticed initially, due to the fact that there was no clear pattern of balance of power emerging after the demise of Soviet Union. Rather, scholars were writing about the rise of multipolarity or actors like Germany etc. By the second decade of the century, as China boldly shed off its ‘biding time, hiding intentions’ strategy and moved to an assertive foreign policy, easternization of the world gradually caught attention. Similarly, the vulnerability of the Western countries to act in unison was also tested by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant annexation of Crimea. More fissures among the Western allies who held a unified alliance during the Cold War period gradually opened up, one of the latest manifestations of which can be found in the recently formed AUKUS—a union among Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US).

This article discusses the particular trends of international order traceable in the 21st century with specific reference to AUKUS. The central research question of the paper is to understand what the nature of the international order is. To explain the research question, this study takes AUKUS as a case study. It argues that in its rudimentary form, AUKUS may seem to be an attempt to forge stronger ties among three Anglophone countries but its viability to sustain this alliance in the long run is questionable. In other words, this article argues that AUKUS carries the trends visible in the patterns of alliance formation and cooperative arrangements of the 21st century, which are short-term interest based and, therefore, have seldom shown any actual functionality. To prove this hypothesis, the paper follows a qualitative methodology. The structure of the paper is divided into three sections apart from an introduction and a conclusion. In the first section of this article, it elaborates upon the central research question and the methodology of the paper. In the next section, it outlines the trends of international order in the 21st century. The discussions on AUKUS are addressed in the third section that draw upon the main argument of the article and assess the viability of AUKUS. The article concludes by summarizing the major points of discussions and identifying the validity of the argument of the article—that AUKUS stands as a testament to how alliances are hurriedly done but may have few substantial contributions in terms of the way alliances function. It is in this context that the next section discusses the central research question and methodology of the paper.

Methods

This article traces the patterns of the current international order and argues how it has become more volatile as well as often based on short-term considerations. As an empirical case study, it looks into the latest alliance formed among the US, the UK, and Australia—AUKUS. As the alliance has emerged in mid-September, 2021, the study follows a qualitative methodology and uses discourse analysis to deliberate the arguments. Discourse analysis of government issued documents, policy papers, and interviews are used as primary materials to analyse the aims and objectives of AUKUS, which are also substantiated by secondary materials. More particularly, this paper uses research articles and books published by Routledge, Springer, Oxford University Press (OUP) and the likes. It has probed into the US State Department reports as well as interviews and analyses published in The Diplomat, The Guardian, and The New York Times, among others. The data collection process followed the use of the Google search engine and later on through different academic accesses to find the latest materials published on the issue in this article. AUKUS is chosen as a case study as a part of an inductive strategy to understand how alliance systems in 21st century are often short-term interests driven. This particular security alliance is chosen as a case study due to a few reasons. It is the latest of its kind that validate the claim of the paper which argues on security alliances are formed on a short-term strategic need. Also, AUKUS has drawn considerable attention as a security alliance that seemed to have challenged the concept of Asia’s security and brought external actors in Asia’s vicinity. The aim of this paper is to open the discussion on a fresh topic—that is AUKUS — so that it can lead to further discussions on a bigger scale regarding other alliances, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and their larger viabilities in the current international order.

International order and strategic environment in the 21st century

The idea of international order is fairly recent in origin only after the state system was considered as stable political organizations based on the principle of sovereignty. The world somewhat reached a geopolitical stability after the end of World War II, which saw a rigorous scrutiny on the nature and characteristics of the future international order. The US’ intention to actively engage in international politics, driven by its reluctant involvement in two World Wars, made it shed off its policy of isolation, outlined under the Monroe Doctrine. This led to two distinct but interrelated developments in America—the study and research on international relations (IR) became a central focus to understand state behaviour and policy responses to shape international order as a superpower. The birth of a liberal

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international order can, thus, be traced since the middle of the 20th century, based on realist assumptions, which clearly outlined the locations of power as West-centric. While the liberal international order is considered as “an ideational and normative” project, it did emerge out of a Western consensus to maintain a particular type of ideological hegemony over the rest of the world, where representation of non-Western countries was not seen as pivotal. In other words, Asian, African, and Latin American countries, who were emerging out of decolonization, were considered as passive actors in this liberal international order than having any active roles, albeit with the exception of the presence of the People’s Republic of China (China) in the highest table of global governance being a part of the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). International order, thus, has been organized as a focus of rule-based order with sovereign equality of nation-states, albeit hierarchical in nature, universal in scope which would be maintained by a specific group of countries. The central thrust of international order can be summarized as composed of “the institutional order, the demonstrated propensity toward multilateral action, and the core group of states”. While the political core of the order lied in democratization, the economic core lay in maintaining a liberal economic order, which received further impetus with the dissolution of Soviet Union and the capitalist economic system standing as the only viable alternative. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the capitalist economic system became omnipresent with a global net wealth increasing from USD $358 trillion in 2000 to USD $514 trillion in 2020. This latest report released confirms that China has overtaken the US as the wealthiest country of the world. China’s integration with the capitalist economic system without political reforms internally has raised much cause of concern in recent years, especially since China has declared its flagship Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) in 2013 and expressed a desire to create a new international order. China defines its version of international order as rule-based international order that respects sovereign equality of states and the applicability of international law for state actors. In essence, one can argue that both the Western and the Chinese versions of international orders resonate in terms of their substance, although one can argue the fundamental area of divergence lies in who would act as the gatekeeper of the international order. Similarly, scholars have argued that instead of China acting as a revolutionary power, it rather acts as a revisionist power, as the US retreated from undertaking global responsibilities especially under the Trump administration, and while China plans to act as a responsible power and a keeper of international order. The Trumpian vision of the world order distanced the US from its European allies due to lacking a coherent foreign policy with regard to the future of the international order. It has also been argued that given the current state of international politics, there is a possibility of the emergence of two parallel international orders—a liberal international order led by the US and its allies and an authoritarian-capitalist international order led by China. This brings us to the question of fluidity in the nature of international order and the strategic environment that we are witnessing in 21st century. During the Cold War period, alliances and interests were ideology-based and led to the formation of strong alliances for the US and Soviet Union. The physical embodiment of the Cold War, to this day, remains in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), although the nature of allegiance and security co-binding of states have been less pronounced in the absence of a clearly defined enemy.

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The nature of 21st century alliances and cooperative frameworks is fluid, short-term interest based, and hurriedly compiled to address the need of the hour. Often, these frameworks are a mixture of similar type of actors, which make these overlapping and leaves few clear goals and objectives. In an age of complex interdependence, especially as the world is witnessing a pandemic, instead of cooperation there is a sudden rise in diplomatic activities, alliance formation, and the arms race. Interestingly, unlike the previous centuries, there are a few particular trends visible in these areas. The centre of gravity of diplomatic activities has shifted to the Indo-Pacific region. Alliance formations are targeted to counter China’s rise and global domination. Last but not the least, the arms race has particularly reached to the Indo-Pacific region, where technological advancements of the countries of this region, particularly of that of China, have reached to such a height that often they do not need to entirely depend upon a Western source to develop their own arsenals. According to a Pentagon report published in November 2021, China is pursuing a policy of “active defense” keeping in mind of “the policy of great rejuvenation of Chinese nation” by 2049 and actively targeting to increase its military arsenal specially the nuclear stockpile. The report caught wider attention as a ‘clarion call’ to pay attention to China’s future intentions in global politics. The report was highly criticized by the Chinese authorities as being “full of prejudice” and a “hype”. The report also stated a possibility of China looking for establishing military bases in Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. Chinese authorities pointed out that the US retains about 750 military bases worldwide which have political, economic, social, and environmental implications, an example that China is not inclined to follow. Under the Biden administration, the world saw a significant American diplomatic manoeuvring throughout the world, as the US took a firm stand on making the Quad 2.0 work, the making of the AUKUS pact, and introducing its competing infrastructure plan Build Back Better World (B3W), vis-à-vis

at the structural level. Regional organizations remained less active or even in some cases dormant during the Cold War period, while the UNSC itself often experienced periods of inactivity due to superpower rivalry. The 21st century saw significant diplomatic manoeuvrings with a number of alliances; cooperative organizations were formed that redefined both the idea of region as well as the motivations for forming such frameworks. Often, these included competing countries within the same bloc, while the same members are targeted through the formation of rival blocs. The formation of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—famously known as BRICS—contradicts with the proposal of Quad, formed with the US, Japan, India, and Australia, where the latter targets China as a disruptor of the rule-based international order, without mentioning its name. Within the Quad, trilateralism emerged involving India, Japan, and Australia. However, under the Biden administration’s leadership, Quad 2.0 has emerged as an effective alliance and with plan of actions to counter China’s BRI, although it does not mention as such in any official statements or policy papers. The US also advances its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) as an alternative for the East Asian countries to counter China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. The latest alliance, so far, has been the emergence of AUKUS, where three Anglophone countries are determined to create their own strategic alliance based on mutual interest. The trust between the US and its European allies was already in decline, which particularly became more pronounced during the Trump administration, but the emergence of AUKUS, which shall be discussed in more details in the next section, has brought it out in the open. Europe’s lack of trust on the US to act as a security umbrella with the emerging Russian assertiveness and China’s geopolitical advances has led it to rethink its own security organization. The idea of a European defence force is not a new one, but the looming euphoria surrounding it and the actions being pursued are certainly something to take note of while charting the strategic environment of this century.


the BRI, the Biden administration experiences significant challenges domestically. While B3W and BRI could be seen as complimentary, B3W continues to present itself as an alternative to BRI and as a representation of a particular group of countries with specific objectives to pursue. Also, in terms of appointing its top diplomats, especially in the Indo-Pacific countries, the Biden administration is lagging behind while China’s diplomatic manoeuvres are at full swing. At this point, the article brings in the discussion on AUKUS, its formation, and its functionality, which provides the empirical evidence of the major argument of the paper.

**AUKUS and its implications**

The talk of an impending ‘new Cold War’ between the US and China was in vogue already, although a number of scholars argued that the nature of strategic rivalry between the two countries is qualitatively different than the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union for a number of reasons. As stated before in this article, Chinese scholars have unequivocally stated that China’s goals are not revolutionary in nature, which certainly marks a qualitative difference in the case of the US-China competition in its current form. The announcement of a trilateral security alliance, AUKUS, on 15 September, 2021 took the world by surprise and brought back the discussion of a ‘new Cold War’ in the strategic parlance once again. The AUKUS stands as a reminder of the Five Eyes (FVEY) of intelligence sharing.

**The AUKUS Alliance: A new Cold War against China**

The AUKUS pact is critical for various reasons. It shows, first, the instability of the international order that sweeps this century where states are redefining their relationships without paying attention to long terms goals. To form the AUKUS, Australia cancelled its USD 37 billion contract to purchase 12 submarines from France. This sudden decision created not only mistrust between Australia and France, but also further distanced the UK.

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from continental Europe. BREXIT, that is the UK’s exit from the European Union (EU), already created a chain of events on how the UK and continental Europe would maintain their relationship, the cancellation of the defence contract created more distrust between the two entities. The diplomatic spat between the UK and France continued; as a preliminary response, France recalled its ambassadors from Australia and the US. As French President Emmanuel Macron termed the Australian decision as “highly irresponsible”, the Prime Minister of UK Boris Johnson responded to France’s reaction by suggesting France should “get a grip” (“prenez un grip” in a mix of French and English) and “donnez-moi un break” (“give me a break”). France is set to resend its ambassador to Australia, although this will leave a permanent scar in the trilateral relationship.

Australia’s decision to shift its defence priorities from France to UK has revived the idea of Europe’s own defence mechanism so that it does not have to depend on any external forces for its security. The discussion on Europe’s strategic autonomy is not a new idea. It has, however, resurfaced recently, especially with the rise of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. European leaders have had contradictory positions on the issue though although with the American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the idea resonated as a viable plan among Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia to create Europe’s own military unit. The AUKUS pact—termed as a ‘moment of truth’ for Europe—created yet another ripple effect that perhaps it was time for Europe to seek for its military independence from the US given how the deal was reached. Although Europe was divided on the proposal to form its own forces after the AUKUS row, understandably due to Central and Eastern European countries apprehensions about losing NATO’s security umbrella against Russia, the idea of Europe’s autonomous army is not yet off the table. The contribution of AUKUS, in this particular context, can be evaluated as creating further division in Europe as well as a possible militarization of the continent that has already experienced two devastating world wars. True, states act on the basis of their national interests—but they cannot ignore the long-term implications of their actions.

The AUKUS pact has also made the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rethink their position in the Indo-Pacific region as well as in the calculations of great powers. There is much apprehension that the pact might affect ASEAN’s centrality in the region once again, like during the Cold War period which stalled the function of the organization. Similarly, concerns rose over the great power rivalry heading to the Indo-Pacific region, which would have multifaceted implications for the region and, more importantly, might dethrone ASEAN’s centrality in terms of decision making for the region. On the one hand, the revival of the Quad shifts focus from ASEAN being the key decision maker of the region, and on the other, the emergence of AUKUS further increases the same fear for ASEAN. While observers believe that Japan might act as a significant player in the region to reduce such concerns for ASEAN by building a bridge between the organization and the other great powers, it does not however diminish ASEAN’s central concern of heightened geopolitical rivalry heading to the region. As the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating mentioned, Australia was rather finding its “security from Asia rather than in Asia” by engaging with outside players like the US and the UK. In fact, one of the most viable criticism came from the former Prime Minister who argued that China’s economic rise has led to a ‘testosterone’ driven response from the great powers and Australian plan to acquire SSNs looked

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“like throwing a handful of toothpicks at the mountain”. True, by the time Australia takes delivery of the SSNs I 2040, China will have advanced far ahead in technological and military arenas. Thus, the emergence of AUKUS is seen as though “it subtracts rather than adds” to regional instability, as “[I]f this was the start of a new “anti-hegemonic coalition” to balance China’s rise, it has not quite blown up on the launchpad, but nor has it taken off as smoothly as intended”. 39 It has been argued, on the other hand, that AUKUS is not only about submarines but, at its heart, technology transfer as well as making Australia’s defence, the closest Anglophone country, fool-proof by making it stronger in the domain of air power as well.40

Conclusion

International order, its stability, and its functioning have come under much scrutiny in recent years. Scholars have argued about the viability of the liberal international order, especially with China’s economic arm reaching far and beyond in different continents. This has created an alarm in the West, specially to the US in that it is diplomatically being proactive by forming a number of alliances. In fact, forming alliances and cooperative partnerships have become a defining characteristic of 21st century, which have competing countries as members, and thus, render the activities of these frameworks often ineffective. Also, the security implications of these pacts are often not evaluated before they are formed and thus, instead of ensuring ‘security’, these pacts, like AUKUS in question, are turning into drivers of insecurity, competitions, and possible confrontations. China’s economic rise, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, has remained unchallenged. The shape of the international order has become volatile in this manner and alliances may lose their relevance in terms of their functionality. The AUKUS, as this article did a detailed analysis, is a testament to this argument. It has made Asia, and in particular the Indo-Pacific region, more vulnerable and conflict-prone.

Data availability

No data are associated with this article.

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